We investigate how North-South Integration a¤ects the location of FDI between the two regions. The theoretical analysis suggests that integration a¤ects the incentives of partner and non-partner Northern countries to locate in the South di¤erently and may lead to investment diversion from the Northern partner. We test our propositions using data from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the …rst major North-South integration scheme. Using the largest possible control group, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator to …nd that NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico has increased since the inception of NAFTA above what is implied by other determinants of FDI and the global upward trend during this time. Other countries have not increased their use of Mexico as an export platform. We …nd some, though weak evidence that inward U.S. FDI has been diverted. The results are robust to a number of di¤erent model and econometric speci…cations as well as the skill data used.
Introduction
A salient feature of international economic relations is the recent proliferation of regional integration schemes. The European Union (EU) has expanded its membership into Eastern Europe while at the same time continuing its move towards "deep"integration, allowing for free movement of labor and capital and introducing a single currency. Many developing countries in Asia and South America have pursued economic integration amongst themselves (ASEAN, Mercosur) or have sought free trade agreements with other developed countries or blocs, such as the EU or the United States. In North America, the 1989 U.S.-Canada free trade agreement was followed quickly by the inclusion of Mexico into a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The latter had been unique at the time as it combined two advanced developed with a developing country, a phenomenon dubbed the 'new regionalism'by Ethier (1998) .
The ever increasing web of integration schemes has important e¤ects on international economic interactions. Traditionally, the analysis of such agreements has focused on their impact on trade ‡ows as they potentially lead to both trade creation (between the partners in the agreement) and trade diversion (from countries now outside of the agreement). But economic integration and its coincident reduction in trade barriers also alters the incentives for …rms when making their location decisions. With NAFTA, the conventional wisdom is that the reduced trade barriers facing exports from Mexico into the U.S. increase the incentive for …rms to locate in Mexico, whose labor costs are low compared to the U.S. and other developed countries, and use it as an export platform.
Another important reason why one would expect NAFTA to change the location pattern of multinational …rms is the commitment e¤ect conveyed by the agreement. The commitment value arises as integration agreements bind future regimes to reforms undertaken and acts beyond any e¤ects due to speci…c provisions of the agreement. Thus it can help alleviate the well-known time inconsistency problem whereby countries have an incentive to impose a higher tax rate ex post although they had committed to national treatment for foreign investors ex ante. This consideration is particularly relevant for Mexico with its history of political instability, default and expropriations. an increase in FDI following NAFTA in participating countries but no intra-NAFTA e¤ect.
Our contribution to the literature is to investigate the e¤ect of NAFTA on FDI comprehensively by considering Mexican as well as U.S. inward FDI from various sources. Moreover, by employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator on the largest possible sample of global FDI, we are better able to disentangle the e¤ects of NAFTA from other changes in the world economy, such as a worldwide rise in multinational activity in the 1990s, unlike the aforementioned studies.
To motivate the empirical analysis, which is the main contribution of the paper, we consider a three-country model (two Northern countries and one Southern country) based on Ekholm et al. (2007) . 2 The Southern country is the low-cost location and …rms from either Northern country may locate the …nal goods assembly process in the Southern country. Initially, trade costs are the same among all countries 3 . Then, one of the Northern countries integrates with the Southern country.
We can think of this scenario as depicting the integration of the United States and Canada (the North) with Mexico in NAFTA. Our model di¤ers from Ekholm et al. (2007) in the following respects. First, we do not con…ne the production of intermediate goods to a …rm's home market; instead we assume that at least one of the production facilities -intermediate or …nal-must be located in the home market. Second, we assume that …rms' …xed costs are invariant to location strategy. Having made this assumption, we focus on di¤erent location con…gurations for sales only in the large, high-cost economy integrating with the small, low-cost economy. Third, our results point out that regional integration not only leads the outsider Northern …rm to shift production from the insider Northern economy to the low-cost, Southern economy but also back to its home 2 Grossman et al. (2006) examine the integration strategies of heterogeneous multinational …rms in a three-country setting. They do not consider economic integration e¤ects, although their model could be extended to do that. Motta and Norman (1996) analyze integration in a three-country model. However, in their model there is no scope for vertical FDI since …nal goods production takes place in a single stage. In our model, on the other hand, the location of intermediate goods production is in the strategy space we consider. 3 Note, however, that we do incorporate the features of the Maquiladora program discussed above.
country. 4 There are a number of predictions that emerge from our model. Chief among them is that not only may North-South integration increase FDI in the South by partner …rms, but it may also decrease investment in the North, ceteris paribus, which we term 'FDI diversion'. The e¤ect on non-partner investment in Mexico is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, the reduction in trade barriers makes Mexico more attractive as an export platform. On the other hand, regional integration may not only lead non-partner FDI to be shifted from the North to the South but also back to its home country as partner country …rms become more competitive in the large integrated market, unlike in Ekholm et al. (2007) . We then test these propositions via a single di¤erence as well as a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator. We include the standard determinants of FDI identi…ed in the recent work of Markusen (2002) , which reduces the likelihood of spurious correlations, thus increasing our con…dence that we indeed isolate the e¤ect of NAFTA.
We use the standard FDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that has been widely used in many studies of the determinants of multinational activity, e.g. by Brainard (1997 Canada has increased, but not from other countries. Indeed, there is some evidence of a slight fall from the latter. We also …nd some, though weak evidence of FDI diversion from the U.S. We caution, however, that we only include foreign investment data in our empirical analysis, while our model allows for a strictly domestic location con…guration as well. Thus, we are not able to identify U.S. investments that switch from being domestic before, but become foreign (Mexican) after NAFTA. The potential investment diversion we account for is solely by non-U.S. …rms.
We do emphasize that our results appear to be robust. We carefully correct for both countrypair speci…c autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in our econometric analysis. We model FDI in a traditional gravity speci…cation as well as the widely used knowledge-capital model one.
We use skill data drawn from the International Labor Organization (ILO) as, e.g., Carr et al. (2001) , but also the updated schooling data from Barro and Lee as, e.g., Blonigen et al. (2003) .
The results are also robust to the consideration of an "announcement e¤ect" since NAFTA was anticipated before its formal inception.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out a three-country model of the location choice of …rms. While it restricts the set of possible location con…gurations for tractability, it is su¢ ciently general to allow for a range of relevant cases. The following section presents the empirical model which is designed to allow testing of the main hypotheses generated by the theory.
After a discussion of our econometric approach and the data, the empirical results are presented, followed by concluding remarks.
Theoretical Model
In this section we present a simple model of location choice and economic integration. There are three countries, two (initially identical) high-and one low cost country. There exists one …rm in each of the high-cost countries that is faced with the decision where to produce an intermediate good and where to assemble the …nal good. We …rst formulate the assumptions and the game played by the …rms. We cannot …nd an analytical solution to the quantity-location game. While we could use numerical simulations as in Ekholm et al. (2007) , we instead concentrate on the equilibrium candidates by dropping the strictly dominated strategies for all parameter values. The remaining nodes of the game represent the "feasible equilibria". Then, we consider two scenarios: one where there is no economic integration and one where one of the high cost and the low cost country integrate. Finally, we compare the results of these two games to arrive at testable hypotheses.
Consider a one-period, two-stage static game in which there are three countries, denoted E, U and M . Countries E and U are identical; they can be referred to simply as N (North). M is a small, low cost country in the south. There exist two …nal goods sectors; X (increasing returns, imperfect competition) and Y (constant returns, perfect competition) and one intermediate good 
where wages and the price of Y are numeraires. The demand function for good X is as follows:
We assume that there are two …rms producing X, one headquartered in E and one in U , and these can be referred to as …rms e and u, respectively. Each …rm aims to maximize pro…t in country U through its choice of production location con…guration and the quantities supplied to the market.
In the …rst stage of this location-quantity game, each …rm chooses its location con…guration and in the second stage makes its quantity choice in a usual Cournot setting by taking the market location con…guration from the previous stage as given. A strategy for …rm h has two elements:
(i) the …rm's production location con…guration for sales in country U which is a set of ordered
where h = (e; ug: The …rst element i signi…es the location choice for the intermediate goods production and the second one j for the …nal goods production. The con…guration l u = fU M g, for example, means that …rm u supplies its own market from an assembly plant in M which uses components produced in U . We assume that at least one of the production facilities -intermediate or …nal-must be located in the home market. As a further simpli…cation, we assume that any production in M consists of …nal assembly. In essence, this con…nes the intermediate goods production sites to i = fE; U g and the …nal goods assembly can be done anywhere, j = fE; U; M g. Finally, since M is a small country, we assume that it has no domestic demand, and so neither …rm will build a plant in M simply to serve M . These assumptions still leave us with a wealth of possibilities to explore such that there are a total of 4 location con…gurations for each …rm which generates 16 potential market supply strategies in country U . De…ne a market location con…guration as:
where L is the set of all possible production location con…gurations for sales in country U .
(ii) the …rm's quantity choice which is
where x h (l) > 0 indicates that …rm h is active in country U ; x h (l) = 0 indicates that …rm h chooses not to sell in country U . Costs of production for the two …rms are assumed identical.
Unit costs for components production in country i; (z i ) and …nal goods production in country j; (c j ) need not be identical. These costs are identical across E and U , but lower in M , i.e.
Establishment by …rm h of a production facility in country i or j incurs a set-up cost F and we simplify the analysis by assuming that these set-up costs are neither country nor …rm speci…c.
Observe that a …rm's quantity choice in two markets is independent and determined by the market location con…guration l; and therefore the total set-up cost of establishing production facilities for sales in country U always adds up to 2F .
Trade costs are assumed to be ad-valorem. The tari¤ rate is t ij 2 (0; 1); i 6 = j for components trade from country i to country j; and t jk 2 (0; 1); j 6 = k for …nal goods trade from country j to country k. We assume that t ij = t jk = t for the sake of simplicity. This rate becomes zero between a country pair in the case of economic integration. On a given link we assume that the cost is the same in both directions for reciprocity reasons.
Aggregate supply to the consumer in country U given the market location con…guration l; is:
and the aggregate pro…t to …rm h from sales in country U with market location con…guration l and market quantity choice x h (l) is:
where b c h (l h ) = [1 + t]z i + c j for i = fE; U g and j = fE; U; M g: For example if …rm e chooses to produce the intermediates in E and assembles them in U for sales in U , then l e = EU . In this case, the production costs will be b c e (l e ) = [1
The exception is the con…guration, l u = fU M g; where b c u (U M ) = z U + c M : Before integration, tari¤s for imports of …nal goods from M to U are only levied on the value-added portion. 5 This is consistent with the Maquiladora program that has been in existence for many years and has facilitated production in Mexico by U.S. …rms. It is important to account for the special provisions since they a¤ect the impact of North American integration on partner versus non-partner …rms.
Denote by X h (l) the set of possible quantity choices in market U for …rm h given the market location con…guration l: The Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the second-stage quantity sub-game for any market location con…guration l is the market quantity choice x (l) such that: 6
Denote by h (l ) the pro…t to …rm h from the Nash equilibrium market quantity choice corresponding to the production location con…guration l: An equilibrium for the …rst-stage location game is a market location con…guration l such that:
2.1 Before Integration Table 1 presents the market supply strategies and their associated payo¤s before integration. Each cell is assigned a number which is stated at the lower left corner of the corresponding cell. The payo¤s are the pro…ts made by each …rm in the equilibrium of the Cournot game. Each cell in this table represents a market location con…guration, l = fl e ; l u g 2 L where elements of l describe the respective supply strategies of …rms e and u in country U . For example, cell number 6 in Table 1 is l = fEU; U M g which translates as follows: Firm e supplies country U from an assembly plant in U which uses components produced in E, whereas …rm u supplies country U from an assembly plant in M which uses components produced in U .
We cannot …nd an analytical solution to this quantity-location game. While we could use numerical simulations, we instead concentrate on the equilibrium candidates by dropping the strictly dominated strategies for all parameter values. Then we derive the changes in these candidates due to economic integration. The shaded cells in the tables are the candidates for equilibria in this quantity-location game, namely the feasible equilibria. 7 Any one or more than one of these cells can be the equilibrium/equilibria depending on the parameter values.
Before economic integration between U and M , U E and EU are strictly dominated strategies for …rm u and U E is a strictly dominated strategy for …rm e. The intuition is that if …rm u outsources any part of its production process, it will always be to M since it has lower production cost than E, while trade cost are no higher.
Lemma 1 Prior to integration between U and M, if u does not invest in M, neither does e.
7 A sample of the calculations that generate these results can be obtained from the authors on request.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the dominant strategy for …rm u is l u = U U for sales in U , then EM can never be the dominant strategy for …rm e. Note that …rm e always deviates from cell number 3 to cell number 2 since the condition for U U to be dominant for …rm u also satis…es the condition for EU to dominate EM for …rm e. If …rm u chooses to remain national, then even though unit costs are lower in M , …rm e will not prefer to produce intermediates in E, ship them to M for assembly and reship the …nished product to U and thus pay tari¤s twice. In other words, if …rm u chooses U U over U M ,
then …rm e will never choose EM over EU since the production cost di¤erences between North (E and U ) and South (M ) are not large enough to cover trade costs for both the shipment of the intermediates and the …nal products for …rm e to prefer EM:
After Integration
Given that we are chie ‡y interested in the e¤ects of North American economic integration on foreign direct investment, we concentrate on the case in which a regional bloc is established between countries U and M: In that case, the tari¤ barriers on both intermediate and …nal goods trade between U and M are completely lifted, making t U M = t M U = 0. Table 2 shows the payo¤ matrix after such integration. Notice the reductions in the number of candidate equilibria compared to the situation before integration. For …rm u; U U , U E and EU are strictly dominated strategies and U E and EU are strictly dominated strategies for …rm e. Only cells number 7 and 8 remain as equilibrium candidates after integration. 8 Changes in the feasible equilibria after economic integration yield a rich set of propositions about FDI creation/diversion in each of the production locations. We restrict our attention to the possibilities which can be derived analytically without numerical simulations. All of our propositions assume that demand in both markets remains una¤ected by integration.
Proposition 1 Integration between U and M has an FDI diversion e¤ ect in U if l e = EU before integration.
This proposition rests on the fact that for …rm e, the strategy involving production in U , EU , is a dominated strategy after integration. Thus, if before integration the dominant strategy is l e U = EU , then …nal assembly is shifted either to E, in which case there is only investment diversion, or to M , in which case there is investment creation in M . In other words, investment diversion from U is by non-partner countries. Note that U U becomes a dominated strategy for …rm u, but since we focus on foreign, not domestic investment, we do not test this prediction of the model.
Proposition 2 Integration between U and M increases …rm u's investment in M if
This proposition stems from the fact that U U becomes a dominated strategy for …rm u after integration. If that strategy was dominant before integration, some production is shifted from U to M which is the dominant strategy for …rm u after integration. Another way of interpreting this result is that economic integration causes new entry into the southern country by …rms in U . If the pre-integration equilibrium is not U U , there may be no change in M -production by …rm u.
Proposition 3 Integration between U and M increases third-country (E) investment in M only if
and only if l e = EU and l u = U U before integration.
If the dominant strategy for …rm e before integration is l e = EU and l u = U U for …rm u, then the …nal assembly is shifted to M by …rm e, and non-partner country investment in M will increase. This is due to the fact that the conditions for EU to be dominant for …rm e before integration also satisfy the condition for EM to dominate EE for …rm e after integration.
Note that a switch from EM before integration to EE after integration (and thus investment diversion from M ) is not possible since the condition for EE to be dominated before integration by any other strategy is the same after integration and does not involve the tari¤ between integrating countries. However, the condition does involve the unit cost of producing in M . One could model rules of origin as increasing this unit cost since they force a …rm to locate additional parts of the production process along with the optimally located ones in M in order to achieve the required minimum local content, as discussed above. In that case, a switch from EM to EE (and thus investment diversion from M ) is a distinct possibility.
This proposition tells us that an increase in export platform FDI in M by non-partner countries is possible only under special conditions. In other words, if the dominant strategy for …rm u before and after integration is l u = U M; then …rm e supplies the U market with exports from E. This is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If …rm u has investment in M before integration (the Maquiladora case) then an increase in third-country (E) investment in M is not possible.
In summary, the model predicts that FDI in U may be diverted to M . Partner and non-partner country investment in the low-cost country, M , may increase. However, the conditions under which investment from the partner versus the non-partner country increases di¤er for the two sets of countries, i.e. the identity of the source country matters. Moreover, there might be circumstances where there might be no increase or even a decrease in the investments of non-partner countries in M depending upon the pre-integration equilibrium. Thus, the question whether there is investment diversion from the U.S. and investment creation/diversion in Mexico, and by whom, is an empirical one.
Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy is to test the propositions from our model outlined above while including control variables drawn from the existing literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment. 9 These come from the seminal study by Brainard (1997) and the pioneering work of Markusen (1997) and Markusen (2002) , which were put to an empirical test in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002) .
We test the propositions generated by our model employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator.
The intuition is to estimate the di¤erence in FDI before and after 1994 for di¤erent host-source combinations involving NAFTA countries (the 'treatment'group) and compare these to the di¤er-ence in FDI before and after 1994 for host-source combinations not involving any NAFTA countries (the 'control'group). We split the 'treatment'group into three in order to test each of our three
propositions from the theoretical model. The …rst sub-group are observations for which the U.S. is the host country of FDI and the source country can be any country other than Canada or Mexico (h1). The second sub-group includes observations for which Mexico is the host and the U.S. or
Canada are the source countries (h2). The …nal sub-group are observations where Mexico is the host country and the source is any country other than the U.S. and Canada (h3). Each of these groups is indicated by a dichotomous variable equal to one if the conditions are satis…ed (d hk ;
There is also an indicator for the NAFTA period (d N ) which equals one for the NAFTA time period (years 1994 and later) and zero before (1993 and earlier). 10 In order to obtain the di¤erence-in-di¤erences, we require interaction terms between each of the country group dummies and the NAFTA dummy. 9 Ekholm et al. (2007) also conduct an empirical analysis, which, however, is very di¤erent from ours. Their dependent variable is the share of a¢ liate sales of US multinationals that go to third countries rather than foreign investment. They only use US data and do not have a breakdown of these shares by country.
1 0 As a robustness check, we vary the starting point of NAFTA in consideration of a possible announcement e¤ect. We also experimented with including separate dichotomous variables for 1994 onwards and 1999 onwards, recognizing that tari¤ cuts were phased in. This did not change the results (Available upon request). Thus, FDI in host i from source j at time t is given by
The coe¢ cients k on the interaction term constitute the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator.
To see this, note that is the baseline e¤ect for observations that are pre-NAFTA (d N = 0) and are not of a (future) NAFTA host (d hk = 0 8 k). Then, + is the e¤ect of NAFTA on non-NAFTA hosts. The di¤erence, i.e. the "NAFTA-e¤ect"for the control group, is therefore given by
For host type k, the pre-and post-NAFTA e¤ects on FDI are given by + k (only
, respectively. Again, the di¤erence between the two is the simple "NAFTA-e¤ect"and is given by + + k + k ( + k ) = + k . Hence, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate is the di¤erence between the simple NAFTA e¤ect for host type k ( + k ) minus the simple NAFTA e¤ect for the control group ( ), which equals k , the coe¢ cient on the interaction term. Two comments on the use of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator are in order before we proceed to the other controls included in the empirical model. First, since the e¤ects of NAFTA that we identify here are all relative to a control group, the identity of the control group matters.
Initially, we used two di¤erent control groups. The …rst includes all FDI observations among non-NAFTA countries as well as U.S. and Canadian outward FDI. The latter is outside of our model and one could argue that most of that FDI is in other highly-developed countries which are 1 1 Note that the theoretical model provides us with no a priori expectations for the individual coe¢ cients , and k . Thus, we limit our discussion to the simple and di¤erence-in-di¤erences e¤ects. Thus, we augment the model by including the following controls:
sumgdp; gdpdi¤ sq; d2 skdgdpd; d2 skdsumg; d1 skdsumg; invcosthost; openhost; opensrc; distance
The …rst term, sumgdp, is expected to be positive as larger combined market size will encourage foreign production. The second term, gdpdi¤ sq, squared di¤erences in GDP between the host and the parent country of foreign investment, is expected to be negative as unequal-sized countries should encourage exporting rather than setting up a plant in the foreign market.
The next three terms are more complicated interaction terms. The third term, d2 skdgdpd, interacts skill di¤erences with GDP di¤erences and a dummy equal to one if the skilled labor abundant country is the parent country. Multinationals are discouraged if skill and GDP di¤erences are too large since the market of the small country is too small and the skilled labor abundant parent country has a comparative advantage in (skill-intensive) headquarter services. The other two terms are interactions of GDP sums and skill di¤erences. The fourth term, d2 skdsumg, is again nonzero if the parent country is skilled-labor intensive. Skill di¤erences encourage vertical di¤erentiation of the production process, but not horizontal multinationals, since skill di¤erences make skilled labor too expensive in that case. Therefore, its sign is theoretically ambiguous. The next term, d1 skdsumg, is nonzero if the skilled labor abundant country is the host country of investment. If this is the case, inward FDI is discouraged for all types of multinationals since the skilled labor abundant country would be expected to be the parent, but not the host country of investment. 13 Four additional controls are included. First is a measure of the cost of investing in the host country. It accounts for formal investment barriers as well as the overall economic climate that a¤ects the decision where to invest. Higher investment costs deter FDI and hence a negative sign is expected for this regressor. Parent country and host country (Mexican) trade costs are measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, an often used measure for the trade openness of a country.
It is used over others because it is available for the entire sample period. Since greater openness corresponds to lower trade costs, a positive sign is expected for parent country, but a negative sign for host country trade costs. 14 Finally, distance is measured as the distance between country capitals. Its sign is theoretically ambiguous since it can proxy for both trade and investment costs.
We also appeal to the well-known gravity model as a robustness check. In the gravity model, the total volume of interactions between two countries -in our case FDI-is proportional to the product of their economic size and diminishes with the distance between the two locations. The model is often extended by including variables to account for income per-capita, trade costs, sea access, language relationships, contiguity, and colonial history. We use both the standard and the extended speci…cations, and augment our model by including the following controls:
lgdphost; lgdpsrc; ldistance; lgdpchost; lgdpcsrc; lopenhost; lopensrc; seahost; seasrc; lang; border; colony
We estimate a double log speci…cation since the multiplicative nature of the gravity equation 1 3 Results are virtually unchanged if we include simpler skill variables for both source and host countries instead. 1 4 Endogeneity may be a concern with this openness measure. However, other measures such as an index from the Global Competitiveness Report are highly correlated with any measure of investment cost. In any case, omitting the openness variables does not change the qualitative results. means that we can take natural logs and obtain a linear relationship between log FDI and other controls. The …rst two terms, lgdphost and lgdpsrc, are the logs of the host and source country GDPs, respectively, and expected to have a positive impact on bilateral FDI since larger masses attract each other. The third term ldistance is the log of the distance between country capitals, also included in our basic speci…cation.
The next two terms, lgdpchost and lgdpcsrc, are the logs of the GDP per-capita in the host and the source countries, respectively. The expected signs of these two variables are positive since higher income countries conduct more FDI, possibly as a result of superior infrastructure. We use the logs of trade openness, lopenhost and lopensrc; to proxy for trade costs and the expected signs are the same as in the knowledge-capital model that we discuss above. Sea access of the host and the source countries, seahost and seasrc; should have a positive e¤ect on FDI since it enhances intra-…rm trade ‡ows. These dummy variables take the value of 1 if the country has sea access and zero other wise. The next three terms are dummy variables which take the value of one if the countries share a common o¢ cial language, a border and a colonial history. All are expected to have positive signs since lower physical and cultural barriers enhance FDI outcomes.
We should note that ascribing the e¤ects that we …nd solely to NAFTA is clearly problematic as other events during the time period that we are looking at may a¤ect the pattern of FDI as well and we have only limited ways to control for those. In addition to NAFTA, Mexico joined the OECD in 1994, but more importantly, the peso crisis in late 1994, early 1995 led to a steep real depreciation of the peso, followed by a real appreciation in the years afterwards. We control for these e¤ects by including Mexican GDP, which fell considerably in 1995. We could also include exchange rates in order to account more directly for the monetary e¤ects of the crisis, but chose to follow real trade theory which does not have a role for exchange rates. Moreover, at least the real appreciation of the peso is likely to be endogenous as it may largely be caused by capital in ‡ows. 15 1 5 We did include exchange rates as a robustness checks, which did not a¤ect the results at all.
Econometric Considerations and Data

Econometric Considerations
The data are in panel form and preliminary tests indicated that both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity were present. Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that ignoring serial correlation in di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation can lead to biased standard errors. We implement several procedures to deal with this potential bias. First, we use a panel data model (Prais-Winsten regression) with panel corrected standard errors. We report results from regressions where the autocorrelation coe¢ cient is assumed to be di¤erent for each observational unit (country pair), but of the …rst order in all cases. The variance-covariance matrix is computed under the assumption that the disturbances are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across units, where each pair of cross-sectional units has their own covariance. For each element in the covariance matrix, all available observations that are common to the two units contributing to the covariance are used to compute it, given that the panel is unbalanced. 16 We have an unbalanced panel because not all data are available for all years of the sample period. We apply the following rules. Since we are primarily interested in the e¤ects of NAFTA, we need su¢ cient data for both the pre-and the post-NAFTA time periods. We have at most seven years of post-NAFTA data (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and only use country-pair observations for which we have at least seven years of pre-NAFTA information for all variables. In order to implement the correction for autocorrelation, no gaps in the data are allowed. Hence, when there is a gap, we limit ourselves to using post-gap information. In other words, if 1983 is available, 1984 is missing, and 1985 onwards is available, the data for this country-pair starts in 1985. One of the robustness checks uses a larger number of observations, although a minimum of six must still be imposed in order to allow for the computation of the autocorrelation coe¢ cients for all country pairs.
In addition to estimating a …rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient, we also used several of the other techniques Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest. We report results from one which works well for samples of more than 20 observational units (we have at least 166 country pairs). It requires estimating standard errors while allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure between time periods, using a generalized White-like formula. This estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is consistent as the number of country pairs tends to in…nity. We report results from this procedure since it turns out to be the only one for which the results are qualitatively di¤erent. 17 FDI, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data are described in detail elsewhere. Figure   1 shows the evolution of FDI in Mexico by source and the United States since 1980. OECD FDI data come from the OECD's International Direct Investment Statistics. 18 Control variable data also come from standard sources. We use PPP-adjusted GDP data from the Penn World Tables (6. 2). Trade data come from the same source. For investment costs, we use the comprehensive measure from Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), which is a composite measure of operations risk, political risk, and a remittance and repatriation factor index. We adjust it such that a higher number corresponds to higher costs. Additional gravity- An important control variable in many studies is skill. The two most common sources of skill data are the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Barro/Lee data on schooling. We use both in our analysis to ensure the robustness of our results. The ILO data measure the number of workers in a particular occupation and characterize some as skilled, some as unskilled, employing the skill de…nitions from Carr et al. (2001) . A country's skill level then is represented by the share of skilled workers. We …ll in missing data using a linear trend between non-missing years.
Data
For just a few countries, additional years are …lled in using the growth rate of the skilled labor share between non-missing years. Alternatively, we use the Barro/Lee data on years of schooling.
These are available only in …ve-year intervals and we …ll in missing values using a linear trend as well. 19 Table 3 contains summary statistics for our basic sample with a minimum of 14 observations per country pair as well as for the larger sample where only a minimum of six observations are required. 20 
Results
Tables 4-6 report the results. Table 4 presents basic results from running a Prais-Winsten regression as outlined above with a couple of basic robustness checks. Table 5 implements both the simple and extended gravity equations, and Table 6 shows results from further robustness checks. Table 4 is our base speci…cation. The sample contains only source-host country pairs for which we have at least 14 observations, i.e. su¢ cient pre-and post-NAFTA information. Speci…cation (2) includes country pairs with fewer observations, which increases the sample size from 2,922 to 5,545 observations. However, many of the newly included country pairs still have twelve or 13 observations. Speci…cation (3) accounts for a possible announcement e¤ect by starting the NAFTA regime dummy in 1992 rather than 1994. 21 1 9 Filling in missing values with repeated values from prior or future years does not change the results. 2 0 For the basic sample, we have complete data for 14 years for 29 host and 33 source countries in addition to the three NAFTA countries. 2 1 Dating the announcement e¤ect to 1991 or 1993 makes no di¤erence to the results. These are available upon request.
Speci…cation (1) in
The top part of the table shows the results for testing our three propositions and reports both the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and the simple di¤erence ones. We …rst notice that there is no evidence of a FDI diversion e¤ect from the U.S. since there is no statistically signi…cant negative sign. The second rows address FDI from NAFTA partners into Mexico. Recall that Proposition 2 suggests that NAFTA has led to an increase in partner country investment in Mexico. Indeed, our results indicate a statistically signi…cant and economically large positive e¤ect. All coe¢ cients, whether simple di¤erence ( + 2 ) or di¤erence-in-di¤erences ( 2 ), are positive and signi…cant regardless of speci…cation. In order to get a sense of the estimated economic e¤ect, we can calculate the predicted amount of FDI by the …nal year of the sample period with and without NAFTA. Carrying out the calculation suggests that the inward FDI stock in 2000 is about 12 percent higher than it would have been without NAFTA. While we acknowledge that this e¤ect includes events that we cannot control for, NAFTA nonetheless appears to have had an important e¤ect on partner FDI in Mexico. 22 The third rows show the estimated NAFTA-e¤ect on FDI from non-NAFTA sources into Mexico.
All coe¢ cients are negative, but only the simple di¤erence ones signi…cantly so. The estimated economic magnitude ranges from a 1.5 to a seven percent lower FDI stock. This result illustrates the importance of controlling for worldwide changes in FDI. Failure to do so would lead us to erroneously conclude that there was a signi…cant decrease in export platform FDI in Mexico. Our …nding is consistent with Proposition 3 and Corollary 1. While an increase in third country investment is possible under very narrow circumstances, the Corollary shows that an increase is not possible if there had been investment from partner countries in Mexico prior to NAFTA, which empirically has clearly been the case. Hence, the insigni…cant result. 23 The coe¢ cients on the determinants of FDI in the second half of Table 4 largely have the expected signs and are statistically signi…cant. As shown in other work, total market size has 2 2 The estimated magnitude is smaller than what Waldkirch (2003) and Cuevas et al. (2005) …nd. Recall that the estimated e¤ect is not the isolated increase observed in Mexico, but that which goes beyond the global rise and what can be explained by other determinants of FDI. 2 3 Note that the model appears to be doing well in predicting FDI. The correlation between actual and predicted FDI stocks is 0.65, statistically signi…cant at the one percent level. Blonigen and Davies (2004) …nd that in their data, the residuals are unreasonably large and di¤er systematically between rich and poor countries. Our residuals appear to be of reasonable size and do not di¤er in any systematic way. a large positive e¤ect on FDI, whereas market size di¤erences deter it. The signs on the skill variables are mostly consistent with Markusen's knowledge-capital model, although more so when using the ILO skill data. Consistent with the predictions of that model, both source and host country openness have a positive e¤ect on FDI, whereas our investment cost measure does not appear to perform well. This may be because of a lack of variation in the measure, especially over time. Table 5 reports the Prais-Winsten results for the gravity model speci…cation. We use the same sample as in our base speci…cation. 24 Column (4) shows the results from the standard gravity estimation with country sizes and distance only whereas (5) includes additional controls relevant in an extended gravity model. Both models provide a good …t as measured by the R 2 which ranges from 0.80 to 0.84. First, consistent with Proposition 1, though in contrast to our basic results, we …nd FDI diversion from the U.S. by non-partner countries since the relevant coe¢ cient in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator ( 1 ) in columns (4) and (5) The coe¢ cients on the determinants of FDI in the gravity framework have the expected signs and are statistically signi…cant. Bilateral FDI between two countries is positively a¤ected by the size, income level, adjacency, language relations and colonial history of these countries, and adversely a¤ected by the distance between them, as conjectured. Table 6 presents the results from additional robustness checks. As discussed above, we …rst allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. Doing so results in far greater magnitudes on our dichotomous variables of interest, though generally also for greater standard errors. In particular, the change in NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico, while large, is no longer signi…cant, while the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator for non-NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico is signi…cantly negative. This result is quite di¤erent from that in all other speci…cations and even though this comparable to ours in magnitude. Moreover, they do not allow for individual (in our case: countrypair speci…c) autocorrelation coe¢ cients, but impose a common one. Thus, we maintain that our Prais-Winsten methodology is appropriate and yields good results, but we do want to alert the reader that these can change when using one speci…c di¤erent methodology.
In contrast, the results are very similar to our basic and gravity speci…cations when using the Barro/Lee skill data (columns 7 and 8). There appears to be no export-platform FDI e¤ect due to NAFTA. Instead, the …ndings suggest that, …rstly, the access to the U.S. market from Mexico was not greatly a¤ected by NAFTA, and secondly, that onerous rules of origin may indeed have had a signi…cant investment preventing e¤ect for investments from countries located outside of North America, which import a signi…cant amount of their intermediates from their home countries. The …ndings underscore that it is misleading to ascribe the observed increase in the raw numbers of FDI following NAFTA to the agreement as doing so fails to control for other important determinants, such as the economic boom in the U.S., and the global rise in FDI. The di¤erential results with respect to NAFTA partner and non-NAFTA FDI into Mexico also show the importance of distinguishing between these two fundamentally di¤erent sources of FDI.
In summary, we …nd that there is ample evidence that North-South economic integration in NAFTA has a¤ected the distribution of FDI in the region, although not always in line with con-ventional wisdom. There is no evidence of an export-platform e¤ect, but the South (Mexico) has clearly succeeded in attracting additional investment from the Northern partner countries. There is some, though weak evidence of an investment diversion e¤ect from the U.S. The inclusion of determinants of FDI that are well-established in the literature, a careful econometric speci…cation that corrects for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, a large control group, and the use of various measures of skill endowments make us con…dent that our results provide a good assessment of the e¤ect of NAFTA on the pattern of FDI.
Conclusion and Directions for Future Work
This paper has investigated the e¤ect of North-South integration on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) in both regions. We built a simple three-country model of location choice. While the model is straightforward, it generates several interesting propositions. There is a possibility that NAFTA results in FDI diversion from the United States. While FDI in Mexico is likely to increase, the incentives for …rms from NAFTA partners versus non-partner countries are a¤ected di¤erently. This is due to the existence of the Maquiladora program before NAFTA, but also to strict rules of origin and a possible commitment e¤ect that a¤ect partner countries more than non-partner ones.
To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper that combines U.S., Mexican and bilateral OECD FDI data to test these hypotheses. Using a careful econometric analysis, we …nd that NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico was positively a¤ected by NAFTA. At the same time, there is some evidence of FDI diversion from the U.S. Non-NAFTA …rms have been using Mexico as an export platform to the U.S. well before NAFTA and we …nd no evidence that NAFTA has resulted in an increasing use of Mexico as a production location for these countries. If anything, FDI may have decreased. This …nding begs a more thorough investigation of the role of discriminatory regulations in FTAs such as rules of origin, which is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
The results are largely robust to model speci…cation, the skill endowment data chosen, the consideration of an "announcement" e¤ect as well as to the inclusion of country-pair observations with a shorter time series. Moreover, we carefully take the serial correlation in the data into account and employ speci…cations that avoid biasing our standard errors. We do add the caveat, however, that use of an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix, one of the methodologies proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004) to deal with the serial correlation problem in the use of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator, does a¤ect the results somewhat.
In future work, we will consider several extensions, both to the theory and the empirics. The theory should incorporate plant-level scale economies through an integrated equilibrium approach.
We also envision a dynamic rather than a static game for economic integration, which will be capable of including announcement and commitment e¤ects more formally. On the empirical side, we note that even in its current form, our model also provides a rich set of results regarding the e¤ect of NAFTA on trade within the region as well as with other countries. These conclusions can be tested using available trade data. We are especially interested in separating out the e¤ects on intermediate versus …nal goods trade.
We also emphasize that we do not wish to imply that the addition of Mexico has had no e¤ect on the distribution of FDI between Canada and the U.S. However, this raises a host of di¤erent questions, which deserve their separate treatment, which we undertake in Waldkirch and TekinKoru (2009).
where X k (l) = x e (l) + x u (l):
Maximizing these two equations with respect to x e (l) and x u (l) in that order and solving for x e (l) and x u (l) in the …rst order conditions gives the equilibrium pro…t levels for each …rm as
where
Proof of Lemma 1
The necessary condition for l = fEM; U U g before integration is given by the following inequalities:
which yield respectively
Compare (16) and (17) . Assuming t 2 (0; 1), the following will hold: (i) 0 < (1 t)A 1 < A 1 ; (ii) 0 < A2 < A5 and (iii) 0 < A 3 < A 4 < 2. Moreover, since c N > c M > 0; z N > 0 and > 0;
when (16) (14), one of the the necessary conditions for l = fEM; U U g.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let …rm u choose l u = U M as its optimum strategy after integration. FDI diversion in U requires l e = EU to be dominated by any other strategy for …rm e. The necessary condition is e ai (EU; U M ) < e ai (EE; U M )
which yields
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (20) and simplifying yields c M < c N which is always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let …rm e choose l e = EE as its optimum strategy. FDI creation in M by …rm u requires
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (22) and simplifying yields c N > c M which is always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proof of Proposition 3
For l = fEU; U U g before integration, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions are
For l = fEM; U M g after integration, the necessary condition is
Suppose that (23) holds. Expression (24) yields
and expression (25) yields Average autocorr.
0.772 0.789 0.772 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Regressions correct for …rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are estimated separately for each country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text for details. Prob > 2 , p-value 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr.
0.940 0.922 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). N/A 0.732 0.757 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported).
